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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Dearborn case resolve conflicts between state legislation and the
State Constitution. The court furthermore observed that in 1951
the United States Supreme Court had found the Louisiana stat-
ute to be a "price-fixing" statute, a finding contrary to that in
the Dearborn case.20
The decision in the present case reflects a trend toward re-
appraisal of fair trade legislation,2 1 apparently incited by the
United States Supreme Court decision in 1952,22 and the sub-
sequent McGuire Act. That fair trade perhaps protects good
will of producers and stops "loss leading" tactics is an issue not
to be entirely disregarded. But the chief argument for fair trade
is that it affords protection for the "little man" who cannot with-
stand competition of large-scale operations. 23 On the other hand,
opponents of fair trade point out that the public is hurt by being
denied the benefits of this competition. 24 Thus, in the context
of public policy, the result of the instant case is to preserve the
benefits of competition by permitting the large-scale operators
to offer fair-trade goods for sale at lower prices. Also, the legal
determination by the court in this instance protects the retailers'
property rights against an unfettered exercise of the will by pri-
vate persons.
James Farrier
CRIMINAL LAW-MISAPPROPRIATION OF FUNDS OF A COMMERCIAL
PARTNERSHIP BY ONE OF THE PARTNERS
Defendant partner allegedly withdrew funds from the part-
nership bank account and converted them to his own use. The
district court sustained a motion to quash the information filed
against the defendant for theft of partnership funds. On appeal
by the state, held, affirmed. Since the partner can eventually be
held liable for the entire debt of a commercial partnership of
20. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951). The
argument that the Supreme Court in this case had overruled the Dearborn deci-
sion was quashed in Schwegmann Bros. v. Eli Lily & Co., 205 F.2d 788 (5th Cir.
1953). This case considered and upheld the McGuire Act.
21. See note 14 supra.
22. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
23. Two chief arguments for fair trade are that the manufacturer's trade mark
has been "exploited and cheapened" and the small retailers driven out of business
by sales of brands below cost. The chief fear is of "price wars" which will trample
the little men down. See Fulda, Resale Price Maintenance, 21 U. Cni. L. REV.
175 (1954), for a full analysis of arguments for and against fair trade.
24. "In addition many newspapers and magazines throughout the country hailed
the Schwegmann decision as a victory for the consumer and the free enterprise
system . . . Fortune magazine repeatedly attacked the fair-trade laws as economi-
cally unsound and harmful to the best interests of consumers." Id. at 186-87.
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which he is a member,' partnership property cannot be consid-
ered the property "of another" as to one of the partners, as re-
quired by the theft article of the Louisiana Criminal Code.2 State
v. Peterson, 232 La. 931, 95 So.2d 608 (1957).
Generally, under the common law, no criminal liability is
imposed upon a partner for the misappropriation of partnership
property.8 Since each of the partners has a joint tenancy in the
property of the partnership, no stealing crime is committed be-
cause the partner has not converted the property "of another."'4
The remedy available to the other partners is to sue for an ac-
counting and dissolution of the partnership and then to obtain
a personal judgment against the defrauding partner in the
amount of what he has taken. 5 Whenever the contract to form
a partnership is executory or the partnership has been dissolved,
a partner may be convicted of theft because the joint tenancy
in the property has not yet begun or has already ended at the
time of the theft.6 Under certain fact situations, some courts
hold that the partner is acting as an officer or agent of the part-
nership in handling the property and is therefore criminally
liable for his misappropriations under embezzlement statutes.7
1. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2872 (1870): "Ordinary partners are not bound in
solido for the debts of the partnership, and no one of them can bind his partners,
unless they have given him power so to do, either specially or by the articles of
partnership.
"Commercial partners are bound in solido for the debts of the partnership."
(Emphasis added.)
2. LA. CraM. CODE art. 67 (1942) : "Theft is the misappropriation or taking
of anything of value which belongs to another .... " (Emphasis added.)
3. By larceny: State v. Brown, 38 Mont. 309, 99 Pac. 954 (1909) ; State v.
Elsbury, 63 Nev. 463, 175 P.2d 430 (1946) ; Hall v. State, 103 Tex. Crim. App
42, 279 S.W. 464 (1926). See also collection of cases in Annot., 169 A.L.R. 372
(1947).
By embezzlement: Ex parte Sanders, 23 Ariz. 20, 201 Pac. 93 (1921); Gary
v. Northwestern Mutual Aid Assn., 87 Iowa 25, 53 N.W. 1086 (1893) ; Pierce v.
Commonwealth, 210 Ky. 465, 276 S.W. 135 (1925) ; State v. Ossendorf, 357 Mo.
366, 208 S.W.2d 209 (1948). It should be noted that in prosecutions for embez-
zlement, the courts also hold that the partner does not belong to any of the classes
of persons covered by the statutes.
By false pretenses: State v. Quinn, 245 Iowa 846, 64 N.W.2d 323 (1954).
4. See note 3 supra. See also collection of cases in Annot., 17 A.L.R. 982
(1922).
5. West v. Ray, 210 La. 25, 26 So.2d 221 (1946) ; Riley v. Riley, 150 Neb.
176, 33 N.W.2d 525 (1948) ; see Annot., 21 A.L.R. 21, 124 (1922).
6. Contract of partnership executory: State v. Brown, 38 Mont. 309, 99 Pac.
954 (1909) ; Napoleon v. State, 3 Tex. Crim. App. 522 (1878).
Partnership dissolved: State v. Matthews, 129 Ind. 281, 28 N.E. 703 (1891)
Sharpe v. Johnston, 59 Mo. 557 (1875).
7. State v. MacGregor, 202 Minn. 579, 279 N.W. 372 (1938) (where thelpart-
ner was the bookkeeper for the partnership) ; State v. Kusnick, 45 Ohio St. 535,
15 N.E. 481 (1888) (where the cashier partner was treated as an agent in re-
ceiving money) ; Commonwealth v. Bovaird, 373 Pa. 47, 95 A.2d 173 (1953)
(where the partner was general manager and agent of the partnership).
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It has also been held that under the Uniform Partnership Act,
each partner is considered an agent of the partnership and sub-
ject to the embezzlement statutes.8
The only previous case in Louisiana which discusses the
problem of theft of partnership property by one of the partners
is State v. Hogg, decided in 1910.9 In that case the court stated
that a partner could not be criminally liable for the misappro-
priation of partnership funds because the existing embezzlement
statute did not impose criminal liability upon a partner and be-
cause the property taken was not that "of another." However,
it does not appear that the court relied too heavily on the Hogg
case in reaching its decision in the instant case, probably be-
cause the Louisiana Criminal Code had not been adopted at the
time of that decision. 10
In the instant case the Supreme Court was faced with the
problem of determining whether the property of a commercial
partnership could be considered the property "of another" as to
one of the partners, as required by Article 67 of the Louisiana
Criminal Code. The court reasoned that since each partner in a
commercial partnership can be held liable for the entire debt of
the partnership under Article 2872 of the Civil Code," the prop-
erty of a commercial partnership is not the property "of an-
other" as to one of the partners. The court bolstered its posi-
tion by emphasizing that all penal statutes should be strictly con-
strued and that the other partners have a civil remedy available
to recover their loss. Consequently, no criminal liability is im-
posed upon a partner who misappropriates the funds of a com-
mercial partnership of which he is a member.
While it is true that the law provides a civil remedy to vic-
timized partners, this does not prohibit the state from imposing
criminal sanctions. A civil remedy is always available against
a thief for the recovery of the property taken or its value.'
2 It
is submitted that the better solution was suggested in well-rea-
soned dissents by Justices McCaleb and Simon, who would hold
8. State v. Sasso, 20 N.J. Super. 158, 89 A.2d 489 (1953). See Section 9 of
the Uniform Partnership Act, "Partner Agent of the Partnership as to Partner-
ship Business."
9. State v. Hogg, 126 La. 1053, 53 So. 225 (1910).
10. Ibid. Another reason why it is believed that the court did not rely too
heavily on the Hogg case is that in that case there proved to be no partnership
,existing. Therefore, the statements concerning the criminal liability of a partner
were merely dicta.
11. See note 1 supra.
12. Emerson v. Sookul, 9 So.2d 325 (La. App. 1942).
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a partner criminally liable under the Louisiana Criminal Code.
Unlike common law jurisdictions, 13 Louisiana treats a partner-
ship as a legal entity, separate and distinct from its members.14
In discussing the legal entity theory of partnerships, the Supreme
Court has stated that "partnership property belongs to the part-
nership, and not to the partners," (emphasis added)1 5 and "it
[a partnership] is a civil person."' 6 Since Article 2 of the Louisi-
ana Criminal Code defines "another" as "any other person or
legal entity," (emphasis added) it would seem that the misap-
propriation of partnership funds by one of the partners would
satisfy all of the requirements of Article 67 of the Louisiana
Criminal Code. It is well settled that a corporation is a legal
entity and that the property of the corporation is not owned by
its stockholders.' Thus, a stockholder can be convicted of theft
of corporation property because he is converting the property
of the legal entity and therefore the property "of another."' 9
The same reasoning could be employed in the partnership situa-
tion in Louisiana since the partnership is treated as a legal en-
tity;20 thus, conversion of partnership property by a partner
would be the conversion of property "of another," i.e., the legal
entity.
Left unsolved is the problem of theft by a partner in an or-
dinary partnership. A partner in an ordinary partnership is not
liable for the entire debt of the partnership, but only for his
virile share of the debt. 21 Since the court in the instant case
based its holding on the rule that the commercial partner can be
liable for the entire debt of the partnership, a different result is
13. Carle v. Carle Tool and Engineering Co., 33 N.J. Super. 469, 110 A.2d
568 (19.54) ; Caplan v. Caplan, 278 N.Y. Supp. 475, 243 App. Div. 456 (1935)
Allison v. Campbell, 117 Tex. 277, 1 S.W.2d 866 (1928).
14. TrappeY v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co., 229 La. 632, 636, 86 So.2d
515, 516 (1956), where the court in holding that a partner could collect work-
men's compensation from the partnership of which he was a member said: "Under
the civil law system, unlike that of the common law, a partnership is an abstract
ideal being with legal relations separate and distinct from those of its individual
members."
15. Toelke v. Toelke, 153 La. 697, 704, 96 So. 536, 539 (1923).
16. Succession of Pitcher, 39 La. Ann. 362, 365, 1 So. 929, 932 (1887). See
also Smith v. McMicken, 3 La. Ann. 319, 322 (1848).
17. See also the Reporter's Comment to Article 2 of the Louisiana Criminal
Code of 1942, which states that "only by an extensive interpretation will [its]
purpose be served."
18. Ricks v. Louisiana Milk Commission, 32 So.2d 643 (La. App. 1947)
Wild v. Standard General Realty Co., 145 So. 58 (La. App. 1932) ; Warrior River
Terminal Co. v. State. 257 Ala. 208, 58 So.2d 100 (1952) ; Matthews v. Minne-
sota Tribune Co., 215 Minn. 369, 10 N.W.2d 230 (1943).
19. Reeves v. State, 95 Ala. 31, 11 So. 158 (1892).
20. See notes 14, 15, 16, supra.
21. See note 1 supra.
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implied in the case of misappropriation of funds belonging to an
ordinary partnership. It is unlikely, however, that such a dis-
tinction was intended by the draftsmen of the Code or the Legis-
lature which enacted it. It is submitted that full effect should
be given to the theory that a partnership is a legal entity and to
Article 2 of the Criminal Code, thus satisfying the requirement
that the taking of property belonging "to another" and thereby
imposing criminal liability upon a defrauding partner. In any
event, it is hoped that subsequent cases will limit the present
holding to cases involving commercial partnerships.
William H. Cook, Jr.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE- PROCEEDINGS OF GRAND JURY -
PRESENCE OF UNAUTHORIZED PERSON
Defendant filed a motion to quash based on the contention
that the presence of a policeman attached to the district attor-
ney's office as an investigator, who "monitored" a "Sound-
scriber" machine used to record testimony of witnesses before
the grand jury, was a violation of the defendant's right of
secrecy during grand jury proceedings. The state contended that
the investigator was present in the capacity of a stenographer,
as contemplated by Article 215 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal
Procedure.' The district court granted defendant's motion. On
appeal, held, affirmed. Article 215 is mandatory in requiring
that grand jury sessions be kept secret. The accused's rights
were substantially violated by the presence of a recording ma-
chine operator who was not one of the persons specifically enu-
merated and authorized to be present at grand jury hearings.
State v. Revere, 232 La. 184, 94 So.2d 25 (1957).
The function of the grand jury is to protect both society and
the individual.2 As an accusatory body, its members decide from
the evidence adduced whether there is sufficient cause for re-
quiring the accused to stand trial and answer the charge made
1. LA. I.S. 15:215 (1950) states: "The sessions of the grand jury shall be
secret, but the district attorney, as their legal adviser, shall have free access to
said sessions; the district attorney may cause the testimony taken before the
grand jury to be reported by a stenographer, who must be first sworn by the fore-
man of the grand jury; and whenever a witness is unable to speak the English
language, the grand jury shall have the right, at its discretion, to employ an inter-
preter to translate the testimony of the witness, but such interpreter shall be first
sworn to keep secret the proceedings of the grand jury."
2. People v. Minet, 296 N.Y. 315, 322, 73 N.E.2d 529, 532 (1947).
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